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Global oil supplies: The impact of resource 
nationalism and political instability 
CEPS Working Document No. 350/ May 2011 
Giacomo Luciani 
Introduction 
Geopolitical threats to hydrocarbon production and exports include several typologies: 
‘resource nationalism’, i.e. the voluntary adoption of policies on the part of the government 
of the producing country; ‘political instability’; and international or domestic conflict, 
including terrorism.  
While the meaning of the above categories may appear evident, all categories require further 
definition and discussion. In real life, the exact boundaries between resource nationalism, 
political instability and conflict are sometimes blurred. 
We shall include under resource nationalism all policies undertaken by the national 
governments of the producing country that restrict access to resources to a subset of 
potential players, or create separation between the domestic and international market, or 
directly impose quantitative limitations to production and exports. These policies may result 
in lower exports, either directly or indirectly. 
Political instability encompasses changes in policies that are the result of changes in the 
structure of power, i.e. in the government in place. Admittedly, once a new government is in 
place it should be regarded as the incumbent government, and its policies therefore would 
fall under the previous category of resource nationalism. However, the concept of political 
instability deserves separate treatment because it aims at measuring the stability of policies 
in the presence of changes in government. It also has an interest with respect to the 
possibility that endemic political instability, i.e. very frequent changes in government or the 
perception thereof, might create such a climate of uncertainty around oil policies that foreign 
actors are discouraged from considering investment. 
Political instability may be the outcome of constitutional processes – as is normal in 
democracies – or extra-constitutional transitions, which we may group under the two main 
typologies of ‘coup d’état’ and ‘revolution’. The former is typically carried out by a minority 
and is a component of the existing power structure; while the latter may be the outcome of a 
mass movement and originates from outsiders. Both cases may be more or less violent. The 
distinction is mainly one of duration: coups d’état and revolutions are processes that may not 
last for long and lead to a change in government or regime within a relatively short time. In 
contrast, civil wars or terrorism may be viewed as the outcome of failed or on-going 
revolutions that drag on in time. 
The distinction might be subtle, but the rationale is clear: if only limited violence is used, 
material damage to infrastructure and installations, including oil installations, will not be an 
important concern; the change in political equilibria and priorities will be the main concern. 
On the other hand, when extensive or prolonged use of violence occurs, oil installations may 
be damaged, either deliberately or accidentally. Obviously, two different sets of issues will 
need to be considered in the two cases. 2 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
The literature on oil supply interruptions has developed a fairly universally accepted list of 
historical events that are characterised as “major disruptions”. Figure 1, below, from the 
Energy Information Administration of the US, illustrates these events. 
Figure 1. 
 
There are eight events considered in this chart, of which five are international conflicts, two 
are domestic political events, and one is a combination of the two. A slightly different listing 
is proposed by the International Energy Agency (see Figure 2 below). Both charts only 
consider “major disruptions”. Here the question arises as to whether we should consider 
only cases in which an existing level of oil supply achieved before the event took place was 
disrupted, i.e. reduced by the event itself; or also cases in which political developments 
prevent the development of oil supplies that would have occurred otherwise. 
Both views are problematic. If we focus on disruptions only, should we consider supply 
developments only in the country/region affected by the event, or at the aggregate global 
level? In many cases, we see that in the event of a shortfall in production in one country, 
production in other countries was increased to compensate, and in the end global supplies 
were not disrupted at all, or disrupted minimally. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Source: International Energy Agency. 
Consideration of the evolution of aggregate global oil supplies shows that production 
remained stable between 1973 and 1974, and only declined the following year. It declined 
between 1979 and 1983; then again between 1998 and 1999 and between 2000 and 2003 (see 
Figure 3 below). 
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Figure 3. 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
In all cases, market mechanisms, i.e. predictable demand response to higher prices, were at 
work, and in the case of the last two declines there is no political event at all that may be 
associated with the decline. 
In the end, reality never conforms to the optimum, and a ‘normal’ level of attrition must be 
envisaged. Most systems normally function below capacity, but if need be they can also work 
above capacity – usually it is deemed that the latter is not sustainable in the long run, but 
what is sustainable? How long is the short run? 
1.  Resource nationalism 
Resource nationalism comprises all policies undertaken by the national governments of the 
producing country that restrict access to resources to a subset of potential players, create 
separation between the domestic and international market, or directly impose quantitative 
limitations on production and exports. 
This definition encompasses a wide variety of policies. 
Access to resources may be forbidden absolutely, on environmental or strategic grounds (an 
example is US restrictions on offshore drilling, recently partially lifted by the Obama 
administration, then re-imposed following the Macondo well blowout); or limited, delayed 
or otherwise hindered by the opposition of the local population or authorities, on 
environmental or ‘fair share’ grounds (an example of both issues being the tar sands in 
Canada). More frequently, access is restricted to specific categories of players.   
Secondly, access to resources may not be restricted to specific categories of players, but the 
development or pace of resource exploitation may be constrained in order to conform to 
OPEC quota discipline or support OPEC action to manage the market – in the case of those 
countries that are not members of OPEC; or in view of extending the productive life of the 
fields. 
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Thirdly, restrictions may be imposed on exports, to benefit domestic consumers and 
industrial users.  
All the above-listed policies allow for considerable variation and flexibility in 
implementation. Resource nationalism is therefore a phenomenon that should be viewed as 
having ups and downs, and adapting to circumstances. 
1.1  Restrictions to access 
Restrictions on access may exist de facto or be enshrined in the law of the country. The 
extreme case is Mexico, where exclusion of foreign companies from upstream oil is written 
into the Constitution. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not go to the 
same extreme: it forbids concessions and production-sharing agreements and only allows for 
service contracts to be offered to foreign enterprises – a rule that the government has tried 
hard to work its way around, without much success.  
Elsewhere, restrictions exist in practice although they may not be publicly acknowledged. 
Saudi Arabia is a case of de facto yet openly proclaimed restrictions, a situation which allows 
for exceptions and adaptations. In fact, Chevron has seen its concession in the Partitioned 
Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia confirmed and extended; and four 
international consortia have been allowed to conduct exploration for gas in the Empty 
Quarter, with Saudi Aramco as minority partner (but they would not be entitled to any oil 
that they may find). The international oil companies’ (IOCs’) access to resources is therefore 
not completely excluded. 
The Russian Federation may offer a case of progressive restrictions that are imposed de facto 
and are not presented as explicit policy: it just so happens that IOCs have progressively been 
squeezed out of the country on a case by case basis and to a variable extent. 
In all countries, the operations of international oil companies are government regulated and 
subject to either a concession or a production sharing agreement or some other form of 
contract. In the negotiations for the conclusion of whatever legal document may be required, 
the government has influence on the choice of the company or composition of the 
consortium that will hold the contract, and can impose the desired level of national 
participation on a case-by-case basis.  
It would be hard to find instances of countries giving no preference to national players – 
even Norway adopted a partially resource nationalist stance at least until the beginning of 
the current century and the privatisation of Statoil – i.e. at a time when Norwegian 
production had passed its peak. 
Restrictions to access are therefore found in degrees and countries may change their position 
along the scale of openness/closure depending on circumstances. Some major producers 
never resorted to nationalisation – Abu Dhabi being the most prominent example. Others 
resorted to partial nationalisation – i.e. nationalisation of some, but not all companies: Libya 
and Nigeria are notable examples. Finally, companies that had resorted to full 
nationalisation later changed course and again opened to international investors: Venezuela, 
Algeria and Qatar are all cases in point.  
Historically, access of international oil companies to resources has progressively faced more 
stringent restrictions. Indeed, IOCs used to enjoy predominant access and control before 
1970, and lost their position in the following decade.  
Changes since 1980 have not been as remarkable as in the crucially important 1970s. Soviet, 
then Russian reserves have declined somewhat as a share of the total, and the share of “Full 6 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
IOC access” has also declined further, but at the same time IOCs have increased the share of 
reserves to which they have equity access in partnership with NOCs.  
In the 1990s and early 2000s, it had been predicted by some that the pendulum would swing 
back, and international companies would be able to acquire much more direct control over 
reserves. This was linked to the expectation that Russia would open up and become fully 
accessible, and the elimination of the Saddam regime in Iraq would be instrumental in 
opening the doors to that country once again. In fact, neither has happened, and if anything 
we have witnessed a toughening of conditions for the IOCs.  
Considering that four out of five countries holding the largest reserves (Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Iraq and Kuwait – roughly half of global reserves) are almost entirely off limits, major shifts 
in distribution will be possible only if the policy of one or more of these countries changes.  
Iraq conducted two rounds of bidding in 2009, which led to the awarding of ten service 
contracts (that is, contracts that do not offer the IOC the possibility of booking reserves) at 
conditions that are judged to be extremely demanding for the companies involved. The 
future of these contracts is still clouded in uncertainty but one thing is clear: the IOCs will 
not have access to equity oil in Iraq for the foreseeable future. 
The Kuwaiti government appears to have given in to opposition from the Parliament and 
renounced “Project Kuwait”, which it had pursued for more than 15 years; but the domestic 
political situation may evolve and a shift in policy may occur.  
Finally, Iran has sought greater involvement of the international oil companies for years, and 
blames unilateral US sanctions for the difficulties it has encountered. This explanation is not 
entirely convincing, and certainly Iran may need to create more attractive conditions to spur 
serious IOC involvement, including allowing equity participation in the reserves – but this 
may well happen if an extended period of low oil prices prevails and the government feels 
the need to push production to meet its expenditure requirements. 
In short, resource nationalism may be viewed as rather normal behaviour on the part of 
governments of oil producing countries. It may have multiple manifestations and come in 
degrees, rarely entirely excluding IOCs from access to resources. Much of the issue of 
resource nationalism is related to expectations, i.e. the extent to which IOCs judge terms that 
are on offer in each country as sufficiently attractive. Opinions on this differ between 
companies, depending on the terms available elsewhere, on alternative investment 
opportunities and price levels, on industry structure, on technology etc. 
The point is: resource nationalism is a manifestation of the fact that each producing country 
wishes to maximise its share of the rent and limit the companies’ share of the same. It is a 
market relationship in which the strength of the bargaining position of each side shifts over 
time. In this sense, resource nationalism restricts oil production; but this is the outcome of 
producing countries protecting their interests, which is their right, obviously. 
1.2  Depletion policies 
In historical experience, we find instances in which governments of oil producing countries 
conflicted with international oil companies because they felt the latter underexploited the 
resources entrusted to them, as well as cases in which the opposite was true.  
Iraq is a clear case of a long-lasting conflict with the international oil companies, which was 
due to various sources of tension, including the Iraqi government’s impression that 
companies were sitting on its oil resources without adequately exploiting them. In turn, 
companies were not willing to invest in Iraq because of enduring conflicts over tax-related 
issues. The Iraqi nationalisation of 1973 was motivated, among other things, by the desire to GLOBAL OIL SUPPLIES: THE IMPACT OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY | 7 
 
significantly expand production and exports. Accordingly, following nationalisation, Iraqi oil 
production increased more rapidly during the rest of the decade than in previous decades, 
until the war with Iran broke out and production was negatively affected (Figure 1, above). 
In the Soviet Union, where foreign investment was out of the question, field management 
practices were very much in favour of maximising short-term production, by using extensive 
water flooding, to the point of damaging reservoirs and possibly reducing the ultimate 
recovery ratio. 
However, the Iraqi or Soviet cases may be viewed as exceptions. In Mexico, nationalisation 
finally took place in 1938, well after the fields that were known and in production at that 
time had peaked. It was a case of reining in the oil companies when the damage to the field 
had already been inflicted.  
In most contemporary cases, the international oil companies wish to maximise short-term 
production provided that good field management practices are followed – it is the local 
government that in some cases prefers to slow down exploitation and keep more of the oil in 
the ground. 
Saudi Arabia is the main case in point. The Kingdom has enunciated a strategy of not 
exceeding a production level which it may confidently maintain for a period of at least 50 
years: no profit-maximising company would consider such an extended plateau, as the 
discounted value of oil to be produced 50 years from today is normally deemed very low 
(although in fact it very much depends on our expectation of prevailing prices at that time, 
about which only speculation is possible).  
According to recent statements, Saudi Arabia believes that the maximum level of production 
defined in this way is 15 million b/d, including some use of currently non-proven reserves. 
New discoveries or a reassessment of known fields may alter this conclusion, and lead to a 
higher – or lower – ceiling. (Also note that it is not clear whether the 50 year time horizon is 
to be interpreted as sliding or fixed from a given, and undefined, initial date. No statement 
exists concerning the beginning of the ‘count down’). The adoption of this rule translates into 
rates of exploitation that are low by international comparison. However, no other producing 
country has a similarly clear-cut and explicitly enunciated drawdown strategy. Most 
producing countries seek to increase their production and exports, while at the same time 
more or less respecting OPEC quotas – but compliance with the latter is less than perfect.  
Even within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abu Dhabi has not manifested a consistent level 
of respect for OPEC quotas, notwithstanding the fact that it never truly faced the need to 
increase production in order to meet budgetary requirements. Similarly, the Kuwaiti 
government has long wished to increase the country’s production, and has pursued a project 
for the limited opening to international oil companies (Project Kuwait) since the early 1990s. 
In Kuwait, it is rather the Parliament that has systematically opposed Project Kuwait, and 
has urged the government to clarify and independently verify the status of the country’s 
reserves, taking into account the opinion of those experts (such as IHS Energy – 
Petroconsultants) who believe that figures for Kuwaiti reserves are exaggerated. 
Outside the Gulf Cooperation Council, practically all producing countries are concerned 
with maximising their production and exports and adopt what they consider to be 
appropriate policies to this end. Some countries that at one stage had adopted a resource 
nationalist attitude later changed course and allowed international oil companies back in. 
Three notable cases in point are Venezuela, Algeria and Qatar. The Russian Federation may 
also be included in this list, if we consider the shift in policy that followed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  8 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
Of these four cases of re-opening, only one has remained unaffected by further changes in 
policy: that is Qatar. Algeria signalled a significant shift in the role of Sonatrach in 2000 and 
possibly even a privatisation of the company1 – but later changed course and this policy now 
appears to be no longer on the cards.  
Venezuela experienced a major shift in policy with the election of President Chavez – a case 
of constitutional transfer of power leading to major oil policy reorientation. The main 
accusation that critics addressed to the company PDVsa, and Chavez upheld, was that it 
undermined OPEC through non-respect of quotas, and did not pursue the maximisation of 
government revenue, on the contrary embarking on projects that were not revenue-
maximising.2  
However, since the showdown between the company and the president in the early months 
of 2003, and the subsequent firing of a large number of the company’s managers, the 
government’s preoccupation has been to maintain production and fill Venezuela’s OPEC 
quotas, rather than avoid overproduction. Following the collapse of oil prices in the latter 
part of 2008, Chavez has signalled a desire to attract additional investment from 
international companies. 
Figure 4. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from BP (2009). 
The figure above explores the relationship between resource nationalism and production 
levels in the case of four Arab countries and Venezuela. It is seen that all countries 
                                                      
1 Ali Aissaoui, “Managing Hydrocarbon Resources in a New Era: the Call from Algeria”, OIES, Oxford 
Energy Comment, July 2000. 
2 Among several critical articles, see: Bernard Mommer, “Sovereignty and Oil”, Oxford Energy Forum 
No. 50, August 2002, pp. 16-17; Bernard Mommer, “Fiscal Regimes and Oil Revenues in the UK, 
Alaska and Venezuela”, OIES, June 2001 (http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM27.pdf? 
PHPSESSI%20D=a5f4cd5bfe859f3d446c41b8462aae35) and Juan Carlos Boue, “The Internationalisation 
Programme of PDVSA” (mimeo) (http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/Internationalisation.pdf).  
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experienced a decline in production until the mid 1980s, which is when OPEC abandoned 
the defence of high posted prices and, after a brief interlude of netback pricing, reverted to 
reference pricing.  
Production declined in countries that nationalised (Algeria, Qatar and Venezuela) as well as 
in countries that did not. Libya surely suffered from sanctions (imposed by the US and 
progressively tightened since 1982; UN sanctions in place 1992-2004). The UAE reduced 
production to abide by OPEC discipline, but promptly increased it again after 1985. 
Similarly, Venezuela rapidly increased its oil production between 1988 and 1998 – the 
“apertura petrolera”, which began around 1990 and developed progressively in the 
following years, contributed to it, but was not the only component. Chavez was elected 
president in 1998: Venezuela thus offers a rather good case of political influence on 
production levels.  
Finally, Qatar too reversed its full nationalisation in the mid 1980s, and has since experienced 
a progressive increase in oil production, thanks to the involvement of international oil 
companies. Interpreting the Algerian record is more complicated: companies were allowed 
back in the late 1980s, and their contribution to Algerian production has progressively 
increased.  
Russia experienced a period of chaotic opening during the Yeltsin presidency, during which 
former state-owned companies were privatised and foreign companies were allowed to 
invest in a not very well-defined legislative environment. The government repeatedly 
submitted to the Duma draft laws envisaging that production sharing agreements would be 
either the standard or in any case an allowed form of upstream contract, but the Duma never 
approved such legislation. As in Kuwait, the sentiment of the elected representatives of the 
people proved more nationalist than the wishes of the government. 
Figure 5. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from BP (2009). 
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The attitude of the Russian government gradually changed following the shift from the 
Yeltsin to the Putin administration. The latter moved to re-establish government control, first 
on companies formally owned by the state, but which had negotiated an extraordinary 
degree of autonomy for themselves (notably Gazprom); then also on some of the privatised 
companies, notably Yukos; and finally on some of the foreign-controlled interests, notably 
the Sakhalin 23 and Kovykta4 projects, and TNK-BP.5 
In the Russian case, establishing a direct relationship between resource nationalism and 
levels of production is tricky. Production levels were highest under the Soviet Union, 
peaking in 1987. Thus, the decline in production began a few years before the end of the 
Soviet State, and might have contributed to the crisis of the latter. After the collapse of the 
Soviet state in 1991, production declined rapidly until 1994, then stagnated until 1999: this 
j u s t  h a p p e n s  t o  b e  t h e  p e r i o d  d u r i n g  w h i c h Yeltsin was president. Production again 
increased rapidly in the early years of the next decade and reached a new peak in 2007, 
slightly declining in 2008, which is when Putin left the presidency. A reading of oil 
production as a function of political leadership would obviously be simplistic, and in any 
case certainly does not corroborate linking oil sector openness with higher production and 
resource nationalism with the opposite. 
1.3  Conclusions on resource nationalism 
We shall tentatively conclude that depletion policy is a determinant of resource nationalism 
in some, but not all cases. The key supporting case is Saudi Arabia: this is certainly very 
important as the country controls close to a quarter of the world’s proven conventional oil 
reserves. But there is plenty of evidence to the contrary.  
In most cases, resource nationalism appears to be rather motivated by rent maximisation. 
Hence we see more restrictive policies adopted when prices are increasing, because the 
producing country’s government will conclude that whatever arrangements are in place do 
not allow the country to obtain a ‘fair share’; and at the same time the government and/or 
the national oil company will enjoy larger financial resources and will feel that they can 
undertake whatever investment is needed on their own, without recourse to IOCs. 
Conversely, when oil prices are low, increasing export volumes will be more important and 
financial resources for investment will be scarcer: the contribution of IOCs is more 
important. 
The spectrum of attitudes depends primarily on structural factors rather than political or 
ideological inclinations. Some countries – primarily those endowed with larger reserves - 
                                                      
3 This is one of two PSA agreements signed under Yeltsin and ‘godfathered’ notwithstanding the 
failure to approve a proper law on PSAs. Both are based on the distant and difficult island of Sakhalin. 
The main partner of Sakhalin was Shell, until end 2006, when Gazprom acquired a 50% stake in the 
project. “Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui, Mitsubishi sign Sakhalin II protocol” official Shell website 
(http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_library/press_releases/2006/sakhalin_pr
otocol_21122006.html), accessed on May 13, 2010. 
4 Kovykta is a large condensate and gas field in Siberia which BP was forced to sell to Gazprom in 
2007. See “Kovykta Project” official BP website (http://www.tnk-bp.com/operations/exploration-
production/projects/kovykta/), accessed on May 13, 2010. 
5 BP’s appointed CEO of TNK, Robert Dudley, was forced to resign in 2008. He was substituted by 
Milhail Fridman of the Alfa-Access Renova Group, signalling loss of control on the part of BP, which 
however maintained 50% ownership. A new CEO, Maxim Barsky, was appointed to take over at the 
beginning of 2011. See FT January 24, 2010 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ae2a3c34-090e-11df-ba88-
00144feabdc0.html). GLOBAL OIL SUPPLIES: THE IMPACT OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY | 11 
 
find nationalist attitudes more attractive than others, and a large number of countries – 
notably those endowed with relatively smaller reserves – never seriously considered 
excluding IOCs. It may appear that some countries are beset by ideological limitations that 
they would like to shrug off, but cannot (Mexico? Kuwait? Iran?). But then one should not 
underestimate the nationalist sentiment in domestic public opinion (Russia, Venezuela, Iraq, 
Kuwait again…). 
Looking towards the future, no fundamental shift is to be expected in the current pattern. 
Rather, there will be oscillations, with some countries opening up at times and closing off at 
others, depending on circumstances such as price levels, availability of resources, the need 
for expensive Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) technology and the like. At the same time, some 
countries will surely remain almost entirely closed and others will continue to rely on IOCs, 
as they have done up to now. 
In the light of recent developments in Iraq, it is likely that this crucially important country 
will open its doors only to a marginal degree. IOCs will be allowed to operate on the basis of 
production-sharing agreements in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq (assuming that Iraq is 
not partitioned), but elsewhere in the country they will be confined to service contracts.  
2.  Restrictions on exports 
Resource nationalism restricts access to resources to national players; restrictions to exports 
are policies through which exports of oil and gas are limited even if access to resources is not 
limited and IOCs are allowed to invest and operate. Generally speaking, the existence of 
restrictions on exports will discourage IOCs from investing in the country, however this is 
far from being a universal or systematically applied rule, and numerous exceptions exist. 
2.1  Export policies  
In some cases, we see countries adopting policies that purely and simply prohibit the export 
of hydrocarbons. This is seen most frequently in the case of natural gas - in some cases also 
for specific petroleum products such as gasoline - to protect domestic supplies. 
Policies banning or restricting the export of natural gas are notable and more widespread 
than often realised. The rationale is very simple: natural gas is a resource, which should be 
reserved to fuel national consumption and development. Countries producing both oil and 
gas frequently view oil as primarily destined for export, but gas to be reserved for domestic 
consumption. 
This attitude has solid economic grounds, because the netback fiscal benefit of exporting gas 
is generally much lower than that of exporting oil. The higher incidence of transmission 
costs, whether by pipeline or as LNG, except for very short distances, reduces the potential 
rent that may be derived from gas production and export. Hence gas is sometimes (only too 
frequently, in fact) purely and simply considered not worth developing (massive flaring still 
takes place in major producing countries such as Nigeria, Angola or even Algeria) or even 
not worth exploration. 
Among the major oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia has a policy of not exporting any 
natural gas, and reserving production exclusively for national users. There is, properly 
speaking, no ban on natural gas exports: no export project has simply ever been 
contemplated. For a long time, Saudi Aramco was not interested in exploring for natural gas. 
As domestic consumption increased and strains appeared in the availability of natural gas, 
this position has now changed. Nevertheless, it is not without reason that IOCs have been 
invited to explore for natural gas, while oil remains off limits. 12 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
Take the example of the UAE, which was the first exporter of LNG from the Gulf, and now is 
forced to import from its neighbour, Qatar, or from Iran (a contract to import gas from Iran 
into Sharjah never became operational because the Iranian side wanted to renegotiate the 
price it had agreed to, and the importer refused to do so). Abu Dhabi has given the go ahead 
to the exploitation of sour gas in the Shah field, which is expected to have a substantially 
higher marginal cost than gas exploited until now.6 Critics of Abu Dhabi’s LNG export 
policy are bound to ask whether it was wise to export gas for a financial return that was 
relatively small and in any case not needed. 
Even Qatar, which is now the most important global exporter, accounting for 20% of total 
global LNG trade in 2009, imposed a moratorium on new projects, in order to have time to 
assess the behaviour of its major field, the North Dome. This moratorium is expected to 
remain in place well into the next decade, and in fact it is not clear that it will ever be lifted. 
Qatar may opt for a slow depletion policy, similar to that pursued for oil by Saudi Arabia; 
and/or it may give preference to adding value to the gas through industrial transformation 
at home – again, similar to what Saudi Arabia has done. Much will depend not only on the 
behaviour of the field, but also on the evolution of demand and prices.  
Gas exports from Iran remain controversial and a strong current exists in the Iranian Majlis 
(Parliament) that favours gas being used for domestic consumption exclusively. While the 
government authorities officially favour export projects and seemingly promote them, in fact 
the only operational export project is the pipeline to Turkey, which has witnessed 
throughput shortfalls in winter, when gas is in high demand in the domestic Iranian market. 
Other countries in which gas exports have been highly controversial are Bangladesh and 
Bolivia. The case of Bangladesh is quite typical, with industry and government in favour of 
an export pipeline to India, but unable to overcome nationalist sentiment in public opinion. 
In the case of Bolivia, controversy over gas exports was instrumental in determining the 
collapse of the Carlos Mesa administration and the election of Evo Morales. The new 
president nationalised gas production and scrapped a project to export gas to Peru for 
liquefaction and further export to the US; however, pipeline gas exports to Brazil continued. 
Exports of LNG from Venezuela have been on the drawing table for two decades at least, but 
little progress has been made. Besides tabling phantasmagorical ideas of pipelines across the 
Amazon to serve the Brazilian market, or soliciting Iranian technical assistance in 
establishing an LNG plant (!), President Chavez has simply not pursued gas exports. In the 
case of Venezuela, we may possibly attribute the negative outcome more to the 
incompetence or dogmatism of the president and his administration than to the desire to 
conserve gas for national use, as a significant opposition to natural gas exports does not 
appear to exist. 
What about Europe? The Netherlands has exported gas for decades but refused to increase 
exports beyond a level that was considered appropriate in order to preserve the long-term 
life of its reservoirs. Norway is exceptional in that it is a major gas producer that until 
recently has had essentially no domestic market for gas; its power requirements being met 
entirely through hydro power. But elsewhere in Europe, gas has been consumed in the 
country where it was discovered, and export projects were not normally considered at all. 
The UK is a – relatively small – exception, exporting gas through the Interconnector pipeline 
for as long as it has had gas available for export. But even in a free market environment, gas 
companies prefer to serve their regular customer base rather than maximising returns 
                                                      
6 The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company ADNOC had selected ConocoPhillips as its partner in this 
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through gas exports, and gas has not flown from the Continent in response to higher prices 
in the UK whenever supplies were tight. 
We shall conclude that de facto reserving gas for national consumption is very common 
behaviour. Only countries with very large reserves relative to domestic consumption 
contemplate gas exports. The refusal to export is made easier by the difficulty of establishing 
a gas export project, meaning that numerous obstacles have to be overcome before an export 
project can be successfully established, and opposition to exports has a relatively easy task. 
The drive to establish export projects is most frequently associated with foreign IOCs 
whenever they – rather than national companies – have discovered the gas, because exports 
promise faster and more reliable valorisation (in convertible currency, not exposed to 
domestic administrative interference) than domestic sales. However, the interest of the IOC 
does not always coincide with the interest of the country, and gas export projects are 
frequently very controversial. 
2.2  Taxation policies 
Export taxes are a tool not only to extract at least part of the rent generated by oil and gas 
production, but also to favour domestic consumers by creating a differential between 
domestic and international prices. The rationale for imposing an export tax, rather than 
resorting to other forms of taxation such as income taxes or royalties, is that an export tax is 
easy to collect while other forms of taxation may be much more difficult to assess. This 
rationale holds little water in the case of crude oil, whose production is relatively easy to 
monitor and is normally carried out by few large-scale companies. When it comes to oil, an 
export tax is a very rudimentary form of taxation, and is thus rarely used. 
The most important and widely debated case of export taxes on crude oil exports is that of 
the Russia Federation. Export taxes on crude oil also exist in Argentina and Vietnam. China 
has an export tax on oil produced by foreign joint venture partners offshore since 2006. 
Kazakhstan imposed an export tax on crude oil in 2003, but abolished it as of January 2009. 
The Russian export duty has been identified as a disincentive to expand production. Oil 
companies lack stimulus to increase production because of the high tax burden. The Russian 
petroleum fiscal system is quite sensitive to world oil prices, but absolutely insensitive to the 
costs of oil production. In 2009, the Energy Ministry indicated that under the current tax 
regime, only 64% of brownfields and just 7% of greenfields in Russia were profitable to 
exploit. The government is afraid that moving from calculating the tax based on revenues to 
accounting only the profit of the companies may lead to substantial decline in revenue. Oil 
export duties are still a very important source of revenue for the state treasury, providing for 
more than half of the oil and gas revenue of the federal budget, and, therefore, about one-
fifth of all budget revenues. In the longer run, it is likely that export taxes and duties on 
crude oil will be substituted for by other, more effective and less distorting forms of taxation. 
2.3  Market (volume/price) policies 
Exports may be restricted because the government pursues a market intervention strategy 
(whatever the target of the same) and modulates exported volumes in order to achieve 
certain price objectives. The obvious case is collective action by OPEC to impose and 
modulate quotas. OPEC quotas are imposed on total production, not on exports – but in fact 
the determination of quota levels is primarily influenced by international market conditions 
and accumulation of stocks, and domestic requirements are added to whatever is believed to 
be the optimal volumes of crude oil to be added to the market.  14 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
Non-OPEC oil exporters may also adopt restrictions to exports in cases of severe weakness in 
oil prices: they are then ‘encouraged’ to align themselves to OPEC practices, either explicitly 
or implicitly. The clearest case happened in 1998-99, when Saudi Arabia pressured Mexico 
and the Russian Federation into unilaterally reducing exports in order to prop up prices. 
Some producers enforce restrictions on the resale of exported crude oil, and only sell to final 
customers (refiners). Most Gulf producers do not allow secondary sales (i.e. reselling) of their 
crude oil, this being a key reason that a market for their crude does not exist or is very 
opaque. Saudi Arabia even differentiates prices as a function of destination, and has different 
price formulas for shipments to the Far East, to Europe and to North America. The rationale 
for this policy is rent maximisation, while guaranteeing the competitiveness of Saudi crude 
oil on all major markets (notably the US market, which Saudi Arabia wants to serve for 
political reasons). 
Destination restrictions are not quite the same as restrictions on overall exports, and do not 
necessarily translate into less oil being available globally. They will just translate into a 
distortion of flow patterns for global oil trade relative to what they would obtain in the 
absence of them. 
The situation is rather more complicated for natural gas, where destination restrictions are 
common, in part imposed by the limited availability of pipeline transmission capacity, in 
part imposed by way of contractual agreement. Although the European Union has declared 
destination clauses in long-term gas supply contracts illegal and unenforceable, very little 
gas flows from one importing country to another.  
Rent maximisation must be recognised as a legitimate interest of any exporting country, and 
is not likely to be abandoned. 
2.4  Domestic pricing policies 
It is very common for oil and gas producers – indeed, for a large number of developing 
countries – to enforce domestic prices that are lower than international prices. In most cases, 
this is done through the determination of administrative prices for gas and petroleum 
products, which the national oil companies must respect. IOCs will not easily be bound by 
such discipline and will tend to export to higher international prices: then either the 
domestic market is served exclusively by the national companies, or forms of export 
restrictions are imposed, openly or surreptitiously.  
The rationale for offering lower than international prices to domestic final consumers is as 
easily understood as it is faulty. The problem might not exist if international prices were 
more stable and increased only gradually. But the wide swings and price explosions as 
experienced in the first half of 2008 are difficult to pass on to domestic consumers in 
countries which export the vast majority of their oil and gas. As hydrocarbons are generally 
sold by government-owned entities, increasing domestic prices will shift purchasing power 
from the population to the government at a time when the latter is likely to be already flush 
with cash. 
That oil and gas importing developing countries should also maintain domestic prices 
artificially low, sometimes at substantial cost to the Treasury, is less easy to understand, but 
the practice is so widespread that we can have little doubt about its traction. 
Obviously, artificially low domes t i c  p r i c e s  w i l l  t e n d  t o  r e s u lt in relatively high demand, 
discouraging conservation and the efficient use of energy as well as the development of 
alternatives. Generalising on this issue, we may say that the problem resides in the lack of 
consensus on the appropriate policy towards the cost of energy to the final consumer. GLOBAL OIL SUPPLIES: THE IMPACT OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY | 15 
 
The use of lower domestic prices as a tool for encouraging industrialisation and economic 
diversification is however a separate matter and is rather more defensible than enforcing low 
prices to the final consumer. Of course situations must be judged on a case-by-case basis, and 
it is possible that feedstock and/or energy prices may be truly excessively low. However, it 
should be recognised that governments compete globally to attract industrial investment 
from global corporations that enjoy considerable discretion in deciding where to locate a new 
plant or expand capacity. However, once the locational decision is made, investors become 
captive of the host country, especially in the case of large production facilities with very high 
up-front investment costs, as is the case for the petrochemical, steel, aluminium and other 
basic industries.  
In this context, investors will require assurance that their key cost elements, be they 
feedstock or energy supply for energy intensive industry, will be available at favourable 
conditions. From the point of view of the oil exporting country, it is desirable to have a large 
base of captive customers, as global corporate investors become once they have decided on a 
location for their capacity. It is therefore justified to offer such price discounts as may be 
necessary to attract the desired investment. 
Offering low-cost inputs is therefore a valid and effective industrial and development policy, 
and has yielded excellent results. The impact of this policy on global energy supplies is 
minimal, and security concerns do not offer a valid reason for criticism. That some of the 
industrial countries object to these practices because they damage competitors established in 
the oil and gas-importing countries is understandable, but one cannot expect that the oil and 
gas exporting countries, which frequently have only limited sources of competitive 
advantage, should give up on using one of the few effective tools at their disposal. 
Indeed, it may be argued that encouraging industrialisation and the local transformation of 
hydrocarbons into various intermediate and/or final products may in the end support global 
energy security, because restrictions will never apply to the export of such higher value-
added products. If more of the industrial processes based on hydrocarbons were to take 
place in the oil and gas producing countries the demand of the importing countries would be 
relatively reduced, and the incentive of the exporters to maximise production and exports 
would be much greater.  
2.5  Conclusions on restrictions to exports 
Our analysis has shown that restrictions on exports are widespread and take many forms. 
The problem is more acute for natural gas, but domestic demand may be favoured over 
exports, also in the case of oil and oil products. All forms of restrictions are, in a sense, a 
threat to security of supply, because they result in lower production and exports ceteris 
paribus. 
That said, it would not make much sense to attempt to estimate the impact of such export 
restrictions on global oil and gas supply, and their respective costs. In the absence of such 
policies, in a perfectly rational world in which all national interests are aligned, oil and gas 
production would be higher than it actually is. Depending on one’s view of available 
resources and on the likelihood of supplies peaking because of the physical and 
technological impossibility of maintaining production, the fact that production is lower than 
might otherwise be the case might be thought good or bad. Some view high oil and gas 
prices as a positive development, because they encourage savings and alternative sources of 
energy. 
Attitudes may also change if success in reducing the global dependence on oil and gas is 
such that the expectation of hydrocarbons becoming more valuable is reversed. Short of that, 16 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
we expect restrictions on export to continue, and, in the case of natural gas, possibly worsen, 
as older fields decline and domestic demand increases. 
3.  Political instability  
Political instability refers to government/regime change leading to changes in policy, whether 
brought about by constitutional or non-constitutional means. It differs from conflict, which is 
discussed in a separate research paper of this project. 
Government change can take place by constitutional means or may be the result of a break in 
constitutional continuity, i.e. a regime change. In the latter case, it can play out quickly or 
develop into civil war. The boundary between the discussion of political instability and that 
of conflict is between a quickly concluded coup and a drawn-out civil war or insurgency. 
In historical experience, it is difficult to see any fundamental difference between 
constitutional and non-constitutional changes in government when it comes to oil and gas 
export policies. In the vast majority of cases, neither category leads to significant changes in 
oil and gas policies: the latter are most frequently motivated by structural factors that are not 
influenced by the political order. The examples of changes in government, which have led to 
no consequential change in oil policies, are too numerous to mention.  
There are a certain number of notable exceptions to this rule, which belong to both categories 
of constitutional and non-constitutional changes. From this point of view, there appears to be 
no strong empirical basis for arguing that government changes within the constitution do not 
entail major shifts in oil and gas policies, while changes outside the constitution do. 
We shall here review a certain number of key cases, illustrating political change 
accompanied by important shifts in oil and gas policies. The cases to be reviewed are: 
1.  the appointment of Mohamed Mossadegh as Prime Minister in Iran, 
2.  the coup d’état which led to the demise of the same and the restoration of the power of 
the Shah, 
3.  the collapse of the monarchy and the advent of General Qasim to power in Iraq, 
4.  the collapse of the monarchy and the advent of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, 
5.  the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
6.  the collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the coming to power of Boris Yeltsin in 
Russia, and other post-Soviet leaders in the key oil and gas producing former Soviet 
republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan), 
7.  the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, 
8.  the election of Vladimir Putin in Russia, 
9.  the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia, 
10.  the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. 
We believe that these ten events include all major cases in which power shifts have led to 
major changes in oil and gas policies. Minor changes – adjustments to existing policies – 
occur more or less continuously, and are implemented by existing as well as new 
governments. Of the ten cases listed above, four (cases #1, 7, 8 and 9) illustrate constitutional 
changes, while the rest represent breaks in constitutional continuity, i.e. regime changes. 
Of the ten episodes, only two are considered major crises by the EIA, that is the Iranian 
nationalisation of 1951 and the Iranian Revolution of 1978; only the latter is considered a 
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but in the direction of increasing, rather than reducing, oil and gas supplies (the coup against 
Mossadegh, possibly the collapse of the Soviet Union).  
The literature considers the PDVSA strike of 2003 as a political crisis, but strictly speaking 
this episode did not entail a change in government. If anything, it should be categorised as a 
failed coup/revolution attempt. The change in government occurred earlier, with the 
democratic election of Chavez to the Venezuelan presidency, and that was accompanied by a 
change in oil policies yet not a sudden crisis or shortfall of production and exports. 
The reason that the rest of these important political changes are not considered as important 
oil supply crises is exactly that they were not accompanied by sudden declines in oil exports. 
Changes in oil policies of key exporting countries may entail significant changes in global oil 
supplies, but will do so over time, not suddenly. It then becomes difficult or impossible to 
isolate and measure the ‘impact’ of policy shifts, as several other influences may enter into 
the picture.  
Considering that the main interest of this paper is about the future, not the past, it is 
appropriate to underline the importance of historical circumstances in which these events 
took place. We need to question whether such events might be replicated and lead to 
comparable shifts in oil and gas policy.  
The nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1951 was instigated by the stubborn 
refusal of the company and the British government to consider a more equal distribution of 
tax revenue between the Iranian and the British governments – at a time when Saudi Arabia 
had reached the so-called 50/50 agreement with Aramco and the US Treasury. Today, no 
comparable circumstances exist anywhere. The Shah was able to restore his power and 
liquidate Mossadegh with the help of the CIA, but then lost power again and neither the 
United States nor any other external power has been able to undermine or ‘moderate’ the 
Islamic Revolution ever since. A US-led coalition did intervene militarily in Iraq to rid the 
country of the regime of Saddam Hussein, but this experience has proven how difficult it is 
to influence domestic politics in an oil producing country: Saddam’s regime survived 
military defeat (against Iran and then against the coalition liberating Kuwait) and stringent 
international sanctions, and nothing less than massive invasion of the country was required 
to dislodge him – all with clearly negative results from the point of view of global oil and gas 
availability. 
Similarly, the coming to power of Qaddafi in 1969 took on an importance that went beyond 
the presence of international oil companies in Libya, because it showed that the weapon of 
boycott, which had succeeded in bringing down Mossadegh, had lost its effectiveness. This 
opened the door to a rapid sequence of shifts in relations between international oil 
companies and producing countries’ governments, beginning with the Tehran-Tripoli 
agreements, and finally leading to nationalisation in many countries and the shifting of the 
power to set posted prices from the IOCs to the OPEC governments. 
The loss of IOCs access to resources essentially took place in the 1970s, and has not changed 
much since. This shift in controlling power from the IOCs to the governments is a historical 
phase which has now essentially concluded, and a new Colonel Qaddafi taking power 
somewhere in a producing country would not have the same impact as it did back in 1969-
70. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union is also an event of a kind, which is unlikely to be replicated. 
The remaining major Communist power in the world – mainland China – is not a major oil 
and gas exporter, and is in fact ‘capitalist’ enough.  18 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
We have commented already on the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union on 
Russia’s openness to international investment and on the apparent inverse relationship 
between the latter and levels of production and export in the transition from Yeltsin to Putin.  
In the FSU republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, power has remained in the hands of 
Soviet incumbents Nazarbaiev and Niyazov, respectively to this date and to 2006; while in 
Azerbaijan a period of instability preceded the advent to power of Heydar Aliyev in 1993; 
the latter was succeeded by his son Ilham in 2003. In all cases, the new independent 
governments have invited the investment of the IOCs and are pushing to increase 
production and exports, with variable success, generally well below initial expectations.  
In all cases, further shifts in power and consequent shifts in oil and gas policies cannot be 
excluded. In Russia, a swing of the pendulum back to greater involvement of the IOCs is 
possible, if the national companies fail to at least maintain oil and gas production levels in 
the face of mounting technical difficulties. A revision of policies may or may not be 
associated with changes in power. In the Central Asian and Caucasian republics a shift in the 
opposite direction is possible, because of the opaque nature of many deals and outcomes that 
are not beyond criticism. However, it is unlikely that any change in power may lead to 
dramatic changes in oil and gas policies, because the countries are objectively in a difficult 
position and have limited alternative options.  
Patrimonial regimes continue to rule some of the key oil and gas producing countries, 
notably Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi (UAE) and Qatar; in Kuwait, a patrimonial regime is 
coupled with a freely elected parliament, resulting in perennial stalemate, as noted above. 
The patrimonial regimes in question have weathered the challenges of recent decades and 
displayed singular durability. We believe that in all likelihood these regimes will remain 
very stable because they have very strong roots in society and control of the oil rent affords 
them exceptionally strong tools for dealing with society’s aspirations.  
In all evidence, the age of frequently repeated military coups belongs to the past, and is an 
increasingly distant memory. Indeed, if anything the region suffers from an excess of 
stability, and incumbents have succeeded in transforming originally non-patrimonial 
regimes into patrimonial ones, in which sons succeed fathers when they die. 
All that said, the possibility of regime changes in some of the major oil and gas producers in 
the Gulf cannot be excluded. What might happen to oil and gas policies in this case? 
As was discussed in detail in previous pages, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait remain essentially 
closed to IOC investment, while Abu Dhabi is open but the government controls the 
activities of foreign oil companies closely. Nationalisation is theoretically possible in Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar, not in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait as there are no foreign companies that may 
be nationalised. More likely, attention will focus on export levels, and a more conservationist 
approach may emerge. This would be in line with the experience of Iran at the time of the 
revolution, and with the precedents of Venezuela and Bolivia. 
As argued in the previous sections of this paper, we believe that a continuation or 
accentuation of policies restricting production and exports of oil and gas, or reserving gas 
especially to domestic uses, is a distinct possibility. Political change may be instrumental in 
provoking shifts in that direction, unless sufficient incentives exist in the global economic 
environment to discourage this tendency. Policy shifts in this direction are more likely to be 
associated with changes in power, including by constitutional means, and are frequently 
associated with the electoral success of populist leaders, but may very well be associated 
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The experience of Iraq since 2003 is extremely telling of prevailing trends. Notwithstanding 
the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime and the occupation of the country by foreign 
forces, followed by the progressive empowerment of a new constitutional order amidst 
multiple contradictions and uncertainties, we have not at all witnessed the unrestrained 
opening and rapid build up of production and exports that was touted by some on the eve of 
the coalition’s intervention. 
We may look at Iraq as a case of political instability, and argue that the reason for the IOCs’ 
lack of investment and oil production stagnation until 2010 was the difficult security 
situation, the absence of an oil and gas law and continuing controversy on central vs. 
provincial control of oil policy. Or we may argue that all of the above have been the outcome 
of deep-rooted resistance to foreign presence in oil and gas, which will never be accepted as 
fully legitimate in a democratic Iraq. In this, the situation of the Kurdish province differs 
from the rest because of the profoundly different political history and the enduring 
experience of autonomy from Baghdad. 
Indeed, with hindsight it is safe to assert that IOCs would have had a much better chance to 
invest in Iraq; and oil and gas production and exports from the latter would have been 
larger, had sanctions been lifted in the mid 90s and agreements then on offer allowed to go 
ahead. This is not to argue that the latter would have been a politically preferable course of 
action, as this is not a topic for this paper, but as further proof that in recent times 
authoritarian regimes have been more prone to seeking the help of international investors, 
while democratically elected leaders are more frequently conditioned by deeply rooted 
nationalist sentiment. 
4.  Conclusions and indications for scenario building 
The discussion and analysis proposed in this paper have shown that there is no easy and 
immediate connection between resource nationalism or political instability and global 
supply of oil and gas. This is emphatically not because political developments are irrelevant 
when it comes to influencing oil and gas supplies, but because this influence is highly 
variable and unpredictable. 
Political factors act as one of the elements that prevent the oil and gas upstream industry 
from behaving in a perfectly economic-rational way, optimizing supply at all times. Instead, 
we live in a suboptimal world, in which reality always falls short of what would be possible 
and ideal. 
The gap between reality and the theoretical optimum is not constant. Political circumstances 
may influence the gap, and let it widen or narrow down. The existence of conditions of 
financial stability and growth - incentivising the transformation of a physical asset, such as 
oil and gas in the ground, into financial assets, or infrastructural/industrial investment - is 
crucially important in determining the attitude of producing countries towards the desirable 
level of production and exports. Financial instability, negative returns on financial assets and 
protectionism against the oil producing countries’ industrial exports all go to support the 
view that it is best to keep oil and/or gas in the ground. 
Similarly, expectations about the future level of oil and gas prices influence political attitudes 
towards oil and gas production and exports. If the market expects that supply will grow 
scarcer in the face of increasing demand, then the incentive to slow down production and 
exports is increased. The adoption of aggressive policies aimed at decarbonisation and 
energy efficiency may have an ambivalent effect: there may be a negative announcement 
effect, because producers will fear demand destruction and invest less in expanding or 
maintaining capacity; and a positive market effect, when demand is effectively reduced, 20 |  GIACOMO LUCIANI 
 
ceteris paribus. Hence the suggestion might be not to entertain policy objectives that cannot 
realistically be reached, and emphasise cooperation and pragmatism rather than 
confrontation and extremism. 
Political instability and resource nationalism have been shown to have rarely been associated 
with acute supply crises or shortfalls. Their effect is rather gradual and normally 
compensated by action in other parts of the system. Today, the system appears quite flexible 
and capable of withstanding even important shocks, primarily thanks to excess capacity 
available in Saudi Arabia. But if Saudi Arabia itself were to get into hot water politically, 
problems may arise even today. For the longer term, the danger that capacity additions may 
fall systematically short of demand increases exists, and would entail a progressive more 
fragile system. 
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